

**Simon Brause & Thomas Poguntke, Consistency Checks IPD Index Round 2 (V2),**

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## Preliminary remarks

The following paper will present various descriptive insights into the new IPD-indices based on the PPDB data from Round 2. To estimate the quality of the measurement several consistency checks were applied. Furthermore, the validity of the IPD-index is tested. All used indices and indicators of round 2 are calculated on the base of the PPDB release date of December 2020. The indices for round 1 are based on the full release versions 1a and 1b (Poguntke, Scarrow and Webb 2020).

The IPD-index of round 2 is based on some different variables, because the data collection protocol of the PPDB changed slightly. Most of the change is due to the transformation of the open questions in round 1 regarding the influence of different party bodies on candidate and party leader selection. The change from open to closed questions is likely to be beneficial for the reliability of the index.

Furthermore, one variable (PartyLeader-Selection-Vote-Process) changed because the former PPDB variables C41PLVT2, C42PLVT3, C44PLVT5, C45PLVT6 and C46PLVT7 are no longer available in round 2. Originally these items measured whether party officials were eligible to take part in the vote of the party leader selection by the virtue of their position. As new indicators the PPDB variables C41PLSELA-C43BPLSELA were chosen. The underlying logic of the new indicator is somewhat different because the new variables measure whether a party body (e.g. a national party body or national party leaders) plays a role in suggesting or proposing leadership candidates for a party. However, it captures the originally intended aspect: the involvement of different official party bodies in the selection of the party leadership. Appendix II denotes the change of all variables and the new composition of the index. All Romanian parties display the same AIPD values in R1. This could be due to a coding error in the PPDB data in R1b. Hence, Romania should be excluded from AIPD in R1b until potential errors are checked.

Just like in round 1, the AIPD is in some cases calculated based on only two components instead of all three components, because the programmatic component produced many missing values (cf. Berge and Poguntke 2017, p. 154)<sup>1</sup>. 24 parties were excluded from the AIPD calculation in round 2 because not sufficient relevant data is available for them in R2. Table 1 displays these parties.

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<sup>1</sup> The correlation between the index with two components and with three components is 0.82.

Table 1: Parties without AIPD values in R2

Country	Party Name	Party ID
Israel	There is a Future	12012
Israel	All of Us	12013
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	27004
Bulgaria	Volya	27005
United States	Democrats	30001
United States	Republicans	30002
Slovakia	Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia	32005
Latvia	Unity	36002
Uganda	Forum for Democratic Change	47002
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	6006
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	14003
Bulgaria	United Patriots	27003
Colombia	Decents	28005
Colombia	FARC	28006
Latvia	Social Democratic Party "Harmony"	36001
Latvia	Farmers' Union of Latvia	36003
Latvia	Green Party of Latvia	36004
Latvia	National Alliance	36005
Latvia	Alliance of Regions	36006
Latvia	Vidzeme Party	36007
Latvia	KPV LV	36008
Latvia	New Conservative Party	36009
Ireland	Solidarity-People Before Profit	11008
Ireland	Independents4Change	11007

The paper is structured as follows. Initially, the descriptive statistics for the AIPD and the PIPD are presented. Moreover, a comparison of geographical regions and between rounds is included. This analysis is followed by the presentation of the consistency checks. The consistency checks were only calculated for parties that were observable in both rounds. This reduces the number of parties from 145 (R1) and 253 (R2) to 131 parties that are represented in both rounds. Only the comparison of these parties enables a consistency check between both rounds. There are some parties that were part of the IPD-indices in R1 but not anymore in R2. Table 2 denotes all parties from R1 missing in R2. Finally, the validity of the IPD-index is tested.

Table 2: Parties part of R1 missing in R2

Country	Party Name	Party ID
Italy	Italy of Values	13005
Belgium	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	3014
Spain	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	18007
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	6006
Italy	The People of Freedom	13001
Germany	Pirate Party	9007
Italy	Union of the Centre	13006
Austria	Alliance for the Future	2005
Poland	Palikot's Movement	16003
Romania	Conservative Party	26002
Poland	United Poland	16006
South Korea	New Frontier Party	21001
Canada	Bloc Quebecois	4003
Israel	Kadima	12001

## Part I: Descriptive statistics IPD R1 and R2

Part I displays the descriptive statistics for the IPD-indices. All cases are included.

### AIPD

The AIPD index of R1 consists of 145 observations, while the AIPD index in R2 covers for 253 parties. The mean value in R1 was 0.62 (std. dev. = 0.17), the median 0.63. In round 2 the mean is 0.64 (std. dev. = 0.16), the median is 0.66. Figure 1 displays the distributions of the AIPD in R1 and R2. The comparison of those values indicates normal distributions with a slight bias towards high values in R1 and R2.

Figure 1: Distribution of AIPD R1 and R2




Figure 2 presents an overview for different regions. Those regions consist of the following countries.

Latin America: Colombia, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Mexico

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Greece, Sweden

Central and Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary

Africa: Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe


East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan

Not part of any region are four countries that did not fit into the categories. Those countries are the USA, Canada, Israel, and Australia.

Latin America displays with a mean of 0.73 (std.dev. = 0.09) the highest AIPD mean in R1. Followed by Western Europe with a mean of 0.64 (std.dev = 0.18) and East Asia (mean = 0.56, std. dev. = 0.11). The lowest AIPD in R1 on average displays Central and Eastern Europe (mean = 0.52, std. dev. = 0.18). Note that Western Europe dominates the number of cases in Round 1 with 87 of 145 observations. In round 2 Western Europe displays the highest mean (0.68, std dev. = 0.13). Followed by Latin America

(mean=0.62, std. dev. = 0.13) and Central Eastern Europe (mean = 0.61, std. dev. = 0.17). East Asia (mean = 0.59, std. dev. = 0.19) and Africa (mean = 0.57, std. dev. = 0.16) show lower AIPD values in R2. Western Europe dominates also R2 regarding the number of observations (117 of 253).


Figure 2: AIPD descriptive statistics R1 & R2 by regions



**PIPD**


The PIPD index of R1 consists of 141 observations, while the PIPD index in R2 covers for 236 parties. The mean value in R1 was 0.35 (std. dev. = 0.33), the median 0.33. In round 2 the mean is 0.38 (std. dev. = 0.36), the median is 0.33. Figure 2 displays the distributions of the PIPD in R1 and R2. The comparison of those values indicates a similar distribution in R1 and R2. In R1 38.3 % of the parties did not envisage any plebiscitary decision-making methods. In R2 this value did not decrease significantly (38.14 %). However, the share of parties with full plebiscitary decision-making methods rose from 8.51 % in R1 to 14.82 % in R2.

Figure 3: Distribution of PIPD R1 and R2



In R1 Latin America displays the highest mean of the PIPD (mean = 0.55, std. dev. = 0.34), followed by East Asia (mean = 0.5, std. dev. = 0.38). Western Europe shows on average a medium level (mean = 0.32, std. dev. = 0.31), while Central and Eastern Europe displays the lowest PIPD mean (mean = 0.18, std. dev. = 0.29). In R2 Western Europe displays the highest mean of the PIPD (mean = 0.46, std. dev. = 0.36), followed by East Asia (mean = 0.41, std. dev. = 0.41). Africa (mean = 0.38, std. dev. = 0.38) and Latin America (mean = 0.32, std. dev. = 0.34) display means on a medium high level. Central and Eastern Europe also shows the lowest mean PIPD value in R2 (mean = 0.26, std. dev. = 0.34).

Figure 4: PIPD descriptive statistics R1 & R2 by regions




Part II: Consistency-checks of the IPD-indices

**AIPD**


The following section provides consistency-checks for the IPD-indices. In sum there are 131 observations available for the AIPD index comparison. The mean value for those 131 observations in round 1 was 0.64 (std. dev. = 0.17), the median 0.66. In round 2 the mean is 0.66 (std. dev. = 0.16), the median is 0.68. Those values indicate a slight increase of intraparty democracy for parties represented in both rounds. Figure 5 reveals, that the distribution has not changed significantly between round 1 and round 2. While the AIPD values were more evenly spread along the continuum in round 1, round 2 displays a stronger concentration of observations around the mode of the distribution.

Figure 5: Distribution of AIPD values for parties included in R 1 & 2



The AIPD suffered in R1 from a high share of missing values of the manifesto indicator; which means that the AIPD values were based on only 2 instead of 3 components in several cases (cf. Berge and Poguntke 2017, p. 149). As an additional consistency check, we calculated the AIPD index entirely without the manifesto component. The AIPD index without manifestos in R1 displays a mean of 0.62 (std. dev. = 0.15) and a median of 0.61. In R2 the index displays a mean of 0.63 (std. dev. = 0.15) and a median of 0.63. Figure 6 reveals a similar distribution in R2 as in R1. In round 1 the distribution is rather right skewed and in round 2 rather left skewed. The correlation between both versions is 0.82.

Figure 6: Distribution of the AIPD in round 1 and round 2 without the programmatic dimension




## PIPD

In sum there are 124 observations available for the PIPD index comparison. The mean value for those 124 observations in round 1 was 0.35 (std. dev. = 0.33), the median 0.33. In round 2 the mean is 0.46 (std. dev. = 0.36), the median is 0.5. Those values indicate a significant increase of intraparty democracy in terms of the inclusion of all party members. Figure 7 reveals that the distribution has changed

between round 1 and round 2. In comparison to round 1, in round 2 a decrease of parties with low PIPD-values and an increase with high values is observable. These observations are only applicable to the cases available in both rounds.

Figure 7: Distribution of PIPD values for parties included in R 1 & 2



*Deviation between R1 and R2*


In the following the differences between round 1 and round 2 are shown. If the measurement of the IPD-index is reliable the deviation from R1 to R2 should not be very high. The differences are calculated for observations that were made in both rounds. For each observation the value of round 2 is subtracted from the value of round 1. The higher the value of this difference, the higher is the deviation between both rounds. Note that all negative values of difference are transformed to positive values. This transformation allows to reasonable interpret a mean of difference between R1 and R2.

**AIPD**

The mean difference between round 1 and round 2 is 0.14 (std. dev. = 0.13). The comparison of the AIPD without manifestos reveals an even smaller margin of deviation. The mean difference in this case is only 0.11 (std. dev. = 0.09). Figure 8 displays the difference between R1 and R2.



Figure 8: Difference AIPD between round 1 and round 2



There are several outliers. The French Republicans, the Israelian Balad, the British Liberal Democrats, the Danish Social Democrats and three parties from Romania (National Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) display difference values over 0.4 in comparison of the AIPD. They also display high values of difference in regard of the AIPD comparison without manifestos. Table 3 denotes the differences of the outliers in the AIPD components between round 1 and round 2.

The French Republicans show changes in the variables Candidate-Selection-Vote, PartyLeader-Selection-Vote-Existent, PartyLeader\_Prerogatives/Accountability and Ex-Officio-Seats\_Executive. In every variable an increase of intraparty-democracy is observable. The changes of the Israelian Balad are attributed to changes in all three dimensions. Round 1 provided no information for manifesto rules, while round 2 did not provide information for personnel selection rules. The inclusiveness of the structural dimension increased slightly between both rounds. The UK Liberal Democrats introduced more exclusive personnel selection rules, while rules regarding the party structure rose to more inclusiveness. The Danish Social Democrats show strong changes in the dimensions personnel and structure. On both dimensions the party increased their inclusiveness of decision-making rules. In both rounds no information over the process of manifesto-making was available.


All Romanian parties display the same AIPD values in R1. This could be the result of a coding error in the PPDB data in R1b. Hence, Romania should be excluded from the usage of the AIPD in R1b, until the potential errors are checked.

Table 3: AIPD component values of the outliers

Round	Country	Partyname	AIPD difference	AIPD	Programme	Personell	Structure
1	France	The Republicans	0.46	0.31	-888	0.25	0.43
2				0.77	-888	0.88	0.66
1	Israel	Balad	0.44	0.44	-888	0.25	0.63
2				0.88	1.00	-888	0.75
1	United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats	0.46	0.88	-888	1.00	0.25
2				0.42	0.00	0.50	0.76
1	Denmark	Social Democrats	0.46	0.30	0.00	0.42	0.48
2				0.76	-888	0.75	0.76
1	Romania	National Liberal Party	0.41	0.26	-888	0.19	0.33
2				0.67	1.00	0.63	0.38
1	Romania	Social Democratic Party	0.44	0.26	-888	0.19	0.33
2				0.70	1.00	0.69	0.42
1	Romania	Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	0.43	0.26	-888	0.19	0.33
2				0.69	1.00	0.63	0.44

The correlation between the AIPD R1 and the AIPD R2 reveals a medium strong positive relationship ( $r = 0.341$ ). The relationship is even stronger for the AIPD indices without the manifesto dimension ( $r = 0.503$ ). Figure 9 displays the bivariate regression estimates for both AIPD indices. The AIPD in R1 explains 12% of the overall variance of the AIPD in R2, the correlation between both indices is positive and highly significant<sup>2</sup>.

Figure 9: Bivariate estimation for the AIPD R1 & R2




It is important to note, that the correlation coefficient and the  $R^2$  is reduced through the integration of some AIPD-values from R1b (Brazil, Chile, Romania) and through the new AIPD-values from R2 (Denmark, Ireland). In the case of Romania, we have already discussed possible data problems. The same could be true for Brazil, Chile, Denmark, and Ireland. We replicated the bivariate analysis without

<sup>2</sup> Estimated with robust standard errors.  $p = 99.9\%$  confidence interval (\*\*\*)

those countries. The r-value reveals a stronger, positive relationship without them ( $r = 0.51$ ). Figure 10 displays the bivariate regression estimates without those countries. The number of observations is reduced to 103. With this case selection the AIPD in R1 explains 26 % of the variance of the AIPD in R2, the correlation is positive and highly significant. This indicates, that the lower  $R^2$  in figure 9 could be attributed to a potential data bias in the countries mentioned. At first sight no problems could be detected in the data for Chile, Brazil, Denmark, and Ireland. However, as those countries reduce the  $R^2$  significantly they should be checked in depth.

Figure 10: Bivariate estimation for the AIPD R1 & R2 (without Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Ireland)




In conclusion, the differences in the AIPD-index between round 1 and round 2 are not noticeably large. The large share of the existent variation between the two rounds should be attributed to regular changes in the party rules. Some of the change is likely to be the result of the modifications in the coding scheme of the PPDB. Furthermore, potential coder bias has been reduced, as all open questions were transformed into closed ones. Additionally, many cases did not provide data for the programmatic component in R1 but do so in R2. This increases potential deviation between both rounds but also improves the measurement quality of the AIPD in R2.

## PIPD

The difference of the PIPD index is slightly larger. In sum there are 124 observations. The mean difference is 0.24 (std. dev. = 0.25). Figure 10 displays the difference of the PIPD between round 1 and round 2.

Figure 11: Difference PIPD between round 1 and round 2



One outlier (Civic Democratic Party, Czech Republic) displays a PIPD value of 1 in Round 1 and a value of 0 in round 2. This is the result of the change of rules regarding the decisions over manifestos and intra-party policy ballots. In R2 all party members of the Civic Democratic Party are entitled to vote in such decision-making processes. The PIPD-index of round 1 is highly correlated with the index of round 2 ( $r= 0.534$ ). To sum up, the deviation between the rounds does not seem to display any systematic error and any variation should be attributed to the change of party rules.

The mean difference between the OIPD index in R1 and R2 is 0.09 (std. dev. = 0.09). Both indices are highly correlated ( $r = 0.366$ ). Only 13 parties have party rules that include open plebiscites. Hence, also the OIPD index displays consistency, although it offers only little empirical relevance.

In conclusion, it is possible to observe deviations in the AIPD and the PIPD indices between round 1 and round 2. However, the differences do not signal any systematic errors in terms of measurement. Most likely, change between the rounds is attributable to change in the individual party rules. Overall,

there seems to be an increase in intraparty democracy from round 1 to round 2. Altogether, this consistency check is also fit to validate the coding of the AIPD and the PIPD index, as it was possible to replicate similar patterns of observations in round 2.

### **Part III: Validation of the IPD-indices**

Regarding the validation of the indices several other procedures were applied. The results of this analyses are presented in the following. The IPD as a latent construct is measured through a formative model (cf. Berge and Poguntke 2017, p. 148). Latent constructs in the form of formative models follow the assumption that the causality flows from the indicators to the construct. The formative model is based on the conceptual complementarity of the used indicators. Indicators in formative models do not need to be correlated, because of the assumption of causality (cf. Arzheimer 2016, p. 101). Most crucial for the validity of formative models is the conceptual clearness of the used indicators. Formative indices are not fit to be tested using instruments like factor analysis or Cronbachs alpha. However, it is possible to perform some empirical checks of measurement quality (cf. Coltman et al. 2008, p. 1252). Therefore, this section presents results of the correlation analyses between the used indicators.

There are no formal assumptions about the correlation of indicators in a formative model. However, the indicators used should at least show the same pattern of directional relationship if they are correlated (cf. Coltman et al. 2008, p. 1252). The correlations were tested between all indicators within the three dimensions and within the whole construct (see table 4). Some indicators displayed some correlation, others did not. Of interest are especially indicators that showed a deviating form of directionality. First, within the three dimensions no indicators displayed problematic correlations, all stronger correlations were positive. Some correlations indicated negative relationships. However, the effect size of these correlation values was very small. Second, the correlations within the whole construct yielded three possibly problematic variables: Candidate-Selection-Vote, Manifesto-Vote and Congress-Voting-Rights. In these three cases, there were stronger, negative correlations. Table 4 displays the correlation values.

The correlation between Manifesto-Vote and PartyLeader-SelectionRules-Existent indicates a negative relationship between the inclusiveness of the say about programmatic decisions within a party and the formalization of the party leader selection process. PartyLeader-SelectionRules-Existent measures the formalization of selection rules for party leaders. This variable was included on the grounds that the formalization of rules tends to guarantee participations rights and should hence promote inclusiveness. However, it does not measure the inclusiveness of these rules directly. Hence, the negative correlation could derive from party leader selection rules that are exclusive. There are in total 39 observations that display the existence of most exclusive formal rules for party leader selection and on the

same hand hold most inclusive programmatic decision rules. Furthermore, there are 91 observations in total that display formal rules for party leader selection that are exclusive. The negative correlation between both variables occurs also in Round 1 (see Appendix I). As stated before, Manifesto-Vote is biased because of the large share of missing values, the negative correlation could also be attributed to this circumstance.

Candidate-Selection-Vote displays negative correlation values with Congress-Voting-Rights, Congress-Frequency and Ex-Officio-Seats-Executive. The negative correlations could derive from the operationalization of Candidate-Selection-Vote. It measures the inclusiveness based on the involvement of the various party levels in the process of candidate selection. Most inclusive is the process if the candidate selection happens on the local level and the least inclusive is the process if the candidate selection happens on the national level. The three structural indicators Congress-Voting-Rights, Congress-Frequency and Ex-Officio-Seats-Executive measure the inclusiveness of a party through the rights and frequency of national delegate meetings. Hence, it could be that the more inclusive a party is at the local level (in Candidate-Selection-Vote), the less inclusive is the national party. Because some powers of the national party meeting are delegated to the subnational party levels. However, this is just a possible argument for the negative correlations. The negative correlation between Candidate-Selection-Vote, Congress-Voting-Rights and Ex-Officio-Seats-Executive does not occur in Round 1. Hence, these effects could be attributed to random bias. The negative correlation between Candidate-Selection-Vote and Congress-Voting-Rights is also observable in Round 1 (see Appendix I). Furthermore, the same logic could apply to the negative correlation between Congress-Voting-Rights and PartyLeader-Selection-Vote-Process. This variable also measures the inclusiveness based on the involvement of the various party levels in the process of party leader selection, while Congress-Voting-Rights measures the inclusiveness solely on the national level. This could be attributed to a coexistence of different electoral systems as in federal countries. In those cases, both variables have their justification, as both indicate an increase in higher intra-party democracy within the whole party.

The AIPD is a construct with three sub-dimensions. The correlations of the indicators are only one hint. Of greater importance is the directionality of the correlations of the sub-dimensions. No indicator displayed negative correlation within its dimension. The correlation of the dimensions does not show problematic results. The dimensions personnel and structure are positively correlated with each other ( $r=0.182$ ), the other results display only very weak correlations. As the correlations of the subdimension display no problematic results, there is no effect within the index that would cause the index-values to rise or to fall if they should not.

Table 4: Correlations of the AIPD indicators

Dimension	Indicator	PartyLeader_SelectionRules_Existent_AIPD	PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_AIPD	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Existent_AIPD	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_AIPD	Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD
Component: Personnel	PartyLeader_SelectionRules_Existent_AIPD	1				
	PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_AIPD	0.069	1			
	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Existent_AIPD	0.005	0.129	1		
	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_AIPD	0.245	0.3701	-0.0622	1	
	Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD	-0.023	0.122	-0.053	-0.076	1
Component: Programme	<b>Manifesto_Vote_AIPD</b>	<b>-0.170</b>	-0.075	0.103	-0.030	0.049
Component: Structure	<b>Congress_VotingRights_AIPD</b>	0.049	0.169	0.022	<b>-0.148</b>	<b>-0.149</b>
	<b>Congress_Frequency_AIPD</b>	-0.082	-0.0154	-0.098	0.137	-0.051
	<b>Ex-Officio-Seats_Executive_AIPD</b>	0.003	0.043	-0.015	0.296	<b>-0.179</b>
	PartyLeader_Prerogatives/Accountability_AIPD	-0.015	0.105	0.001	0.214	0.241

Table continued below

Dimension	Indicator	Manifesto_Vote_AIPD	Congress_VotingRights_AIPD	Congress_Frequency_AIPD	Ex-Officio-Seats_Executive_AIPD	PartyLeader_Prerogatives/Accountability_AIPD
Component: Programme	Manifesto_Vote_AIPD	1				
Component: Structure	<b>Congress_VotingRights_AIPD</b>	<b>-0.109</b>	1			
	Congress_Frequency_AIPD	0.037	0.065	1		
	Ex-Officio-Seats_Executive_AIPD	0.177	-0.018	0.142	1	
	PartyLeader_Prerogatives/Accountability_AIPD	-0.016	-0.055	0.224	0.150	1

Table 5: correlations of the PIPD indicators

Dimension	Indicator	Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_PIPD	Manifesto_Vote_PIPD	Candidate_Selection_Vote_PIPD	PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_PIPD
Component: Programme	Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_PIPD	1			
	Manifesto_Vote_PIPD	0.067	1		
Component: Personnell	Candidate_Selection_Vote_PIPD	<b>-0.239</b>	0.296	1	
	PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_PIPD	<b>-0.215</b>	-0.099	0.285	1

The correlations were also tested for the PIPD-Index (see table 5). The results reveal that there are positive correlations within the two dimensions (Component Programme, Component Personnel). However, the results also reveal stronger negative correlations between Ballot-PolicyIssue-Vote, PartyLeader-Selection-Vote and Candidate-Selection-Vote. Hypothetically, if the items are correlated, they should display a positive relationship. Ballot-PolicyIssue-Vote measures if party members or other voters are eligible to vote in intra-party policy ballots. In sum only 71 of 243 parties allow such votes. 67 of the 71 allow the vote only for party members. Following the PIPD-coding rules Ballot-PolicyIssue-Vote is coded with 1, if only party members are eligible to vote and it is coded with 0 if other actors are eligible to vote. In total only four parties are coded with 0 according to the IPD-coding rules. Hence, the negative correlation could derive from the unbalanced distribution of values within the variable Ballot-PolicyIssue-Vote.

As argued before there is no formal empirical process to test formative models. More important is that the formative model consists of all theoretically relevant components to measure the latent construct (cf. Coltman et al. 2008, p. 1253). Hence, the empirical check of validity is only an aspect to observe potential measurement errors. This aspect should not be overestimated. Overall, there are only minor reasons for concern. They are all tied to three of the used indicators: PartyLeader-SelectionRules-Existent, Candidate-Selection-Vote and Ballot-PolicyIssue-Vote. However, those indicators display only negative correlations with indicators outside of their own dimensions. These show no problematic results. Furthermore, different case selections (e.g. without R1b, or without Denmark and Ireland) produced varying correlations results. This indicates that the negative correlations could be heavily biased by the small number of cases. Additionally, the AIPD, as a formative index may exhibit some counter-intuitive correlations simply because the variety of institutional rules is so large that 'strange' combinations can occur. Of greater importance are the correlations of the three sub-dimensions. There were no problematic correlations within the dimensions and between those. Hence, no potential negative effect found would lead any AIPD or PIPD value to change in a direction it should not.



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## Appendix I: correlation results of round 1

Dimension	Indicators	PartyLeader_SelectionRules_Existent_AIPD	Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD
Component: Personnel	PartyLeader_SelectionRules_Existent_AIPD	1	-0.059
	PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_AIPD	.a	.a
	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Existent_AIPD	0.055	0.228
	PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_AIPD	0.074	0.139
	Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD	-0.059	1
Component: Programme	<b>Manifesto_Vote_AIPD</b>	<b>-0.166</b>	0.320
Component: Structure	<b>Congress_VotingRights_AIPD</b>	0.181	<b>-0.243</b>
	<b>Congress_Frequency_AIPD</b>	0.103	0.300
	<b>Ex-Officio-Seats_Executive_AIPD</b>	<b>-0.114</b>	0.096
	PartyLeader_Prerogatives/Accountability_AIPD	-0.073	0.126

## Appendix II: Description of changes in the IPD-Index (PPDB Round 2)

The IPD-index of round 2 is based on some different variables, as the composition of the PPDB slightly changed. All the change is attributed to the transformation of the open questions in round 1 regarding the influence of different party bodies on the candidate and the party leader selection. The table below denotes the change of all variables and the new configuration.

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Organizational Structure	<b><i>IPD-Variable: Congress_VotingRights_AIPD (cvrAIPD)</i></b>		only the variable names changed
	Opening Question: <u>CR35CONNUM</u> : How many national party congresses were held in the past year? 0. None / 1. One / 2. two or more	Opening Question: Which of the following were eligible to vote at this congress? (C119CONVOT1 – C123CONVOT5)	
	<u>CR42CON1D</u> : Which of the following were eligible to vote at this congress? Delegates sent from local parties 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable [there was no congress]	C119CONVOT1: Voting eligible: Delegates sent from local parties. 1. Yes 2. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	<u>CR43CON1E</u> : Which of the following were eligible to vote at this congress? Delegates sent from regional parties 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C120CONVOT2: Voting eligible: Delegates sent from regional parties. 1. Yes 2. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	<u>CR44CON1F</u> : Which of the following were eligible to vote at this congress? All party members in attendance 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C121CONVOT3: Voting eligible: All party members in attendance. 1. Yes 2. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	<u>CR45CON1G</u> : Which of the following were eligible to vote at this congress? All party members, whether in attendance or not (internet voting, for instance) 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C122CONVOT4: Voting eligible: All party members, whether in attendance or not (internet voting, for instance). 1. Yes 2. No -888. Missing -999. NA	

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	
	<b>IPD-Variable: Congress_Frequency_AIPD (cfAIPD)</b>		<b>Comments on change</b>
Organizational Structure	A78CONFREQ: According to the party statutes, how frequently MUST a party congress be held? In number of years.	A78CONFREQ: According to the party statutes, how frequently MUST a party congress be held? In number of years.	nothing changed
Organizational Structure	<b>IPD-Variable: Ex-Officio-Seats_Executive_AIPD (eoseAIPD) Which of the following sit as ex officio members with full voting rights on the party's highest executive body?</b>		<b>Comments on change</b>
	A85EXCSTATE: Leaders of state/provincial or regional parties. 1. Yes / 2. No	A85EXCSTATE: Leaders of state/provincial or regional parties. 1. Yes / 2. No	nothing changed
	A86EXCPM: The prime minister or chancellor, when s/he is a member of this party. 1. Yes / 2. No	A86EXCPM: The prime minister or chancellor, when s/he is a member of this party. 1. Yes / 2. No	
	A87EXCPRES: The president (in presidential or semi-presidential systems), when s/he is a member of this party.	A87EXCPRES: The president (in presidential or semi-presidential systems), when s/he is a member of this party.	
	A88EXCMIN: Government ministers, when they are members of this party. 1. Yes / 2. No	A88EXCMIN: Government ministers, when they are members of this party. 1. Yes / 2. No	
	A89EXCPPG: Leader of the party group in the lower house of the legislature. 1. Yes / 2. No	A89EXCPPG: Leader of the party group in the lower house of the legislature. 1. Yes / 2. No	

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Decision-Making: Personnel	<b>IPD-Variables:</b> <b>(1) Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD (csvAIPD)</b> <b>(2) Candidate_Selection_Vote_PIPD (csvPIP)</b>		<b>The original variables are no longer open questions but closed. This reduces coder bias but could attribute to some differences between the IPD- Index in R1 and the IPD- Index in R2.</b>
	B22CANRUL2TXT: Individual Members PIPD-Variable: Candidate_Selection_Vote_PIPD (see table 2b in Part II)	B22CANSELC Do individual members play a role in Selecting/Deciding on candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	B23CANRUL3TXT: local level organization (delegate meeting and/or local leadership)	B23CANSELC Do local level organizations (meeting and/or local leadership) play a role in Selecting/Deciding on candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	B24CANRUL4TXT: regional organization (delegate meeting and/or regional leadership)	B24CANSELC Do regional/state organizations (meeting and/or regional leadership) play a role in Selecting/Deciding on candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA	
	B25CANRUL5TXT: national organization (delegate meeting and/or national Leadership)	B25ACANSELC Do regional/state organizations (meeting and/or regional leadership) play a role in suggesting/proposing candidates for party consideration? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA	

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Decision-Making: Programme (and Issues)	<b><i>IPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_PIPD (bpvPIP)</i></b>		
	C8REF8 According to the statutes, which of the following are eligible to vote in these intra-party policy ballots? 1. Members / 2. Members plus other registered supporters / 3. All voters / 4. Procedure not specified in party statutes / -999. Not applicable PIPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_PIPD (see table 2b in Part II)	C8REF8 According to the statutes, which of the following are eligible to vote in these intra-party policy ballots? 1. Members / 2. Members plus other registered supporters / 3. All voters / 4. Procedure not specified in party statutes / -999. NA PIPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_PIPD (see table 2b in Part II)	nothing changed
Decision-Making: Programme (and Issues)	<b><i>IPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_OIPD (bpvOIPD)</i></b>		<b>Comments on change</b>
	C8REF8 According to the statutes, which of the following are eligible to vote in these intra-party policy ballots? 1. Members / 2. Members plus other registered supporters / 3. All voters / 4. Procedure not specified in party statutes / -999. Not applicable OIPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_OIPD (see table 2c in Part II)	C8REF8 According to the statutes, which of the following are eligible to vote in these intra-party policy ballots? 1. Members / 2. Members plus other registered supporters / 3. All voters / 4. Procedure not specified in party statutes / -999. NA OIPD-Variable: Ballot_PolicyIssue_Vote_OIPD (see table 2c in Part II)	nothing changed

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Organizational Structure	<i>IPD-Variable: PartyLeader_Prerogatives/Accountability_AIPD (ppaAIPD)</i>		
	C15LDRSUM1 Party statutes give the party leader the right to summon party officials. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C15LDRSUM1 Party statutes give the party leader the right to summon party officials. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. NA	nothing changed
	C16DRSUM2 Party statutes give the party leader the right to summon the party congress. 1. Yes/2. No/-999. Not applicable	C16DRSUM2 Party statutes give the party leader the right to summon the party congress. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. NA	
	C18LDRROLE2 Party statutes explicitly mention that the party leader is accountable to the party executive or party congress. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C18LDRROLE2 Party statutes explicitly mention that the party leader is accountable to the party executive or party congress. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. NA	
	C19LDRROLE3 Party statutes explicitly mention that the national party can only enter coalition agreements with the consent of the party leader. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C19LDRROLE3 Party statutes explicitly mention that the national party can only enter coalition agreements with the consent of the party leader. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. NA	
	A90EXCLDR: According to party rules, how many members of the highest party executive may the party leader directly appoint? -999. Not applicable	A90EXCLDR: According to party rules, how many members of the highest party executive may the party leader directly appoint? -999. NA	



IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Decision-Making: Personnel	<b><i>IPD-Variable: PartyLeader_SelectionRules_ Existent_ AIPD (pseAIPD)</i></b>		
	C24PLRULE: Are there formal party rules setting out the process for selecting the holder of this position? 1. Yes, in party statutes 2. Not entirely spelled out in statutes, but rules were created for this year's process 3. There were no written rules 4. There were written rules, but they were not followed this year -999. Not applicable	C24PLRULE: Are there formal party rules setting out the process for selecting the holder of this position? 1. Yes, in party statutes 2. Not entirely spelled out in statutes, but rules were created for this year's process 3. There were no written rules 4. There were written rules, but they were not followed this year -999. NA	nothing changed
Decision-Making: Personnel	<b><i>IPD-Variable: PartyLeader_SelectionVote_ Existent_ AIPD</i></b>		<b>Comments on change</b>
	C40PLVT1: There was a vote (advisory or binding) at the most inclusive stage of the leadership selection process. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable	C40PLVT1: There was a vote (advisory or binding) at the most inclusive stage of the leadership selection process. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. NA	nothing changed

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
	<p><b>IPD-Variables:</b></p> <p><b>(1) PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_AIPD (plsvAIPD)</b></p> <p><b>(2) PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_PIPD (plsvPIPD)</b></p> <p><b>(3) PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_OPIPD (plsvOPIPD)</b></p>		
Decision-Making: Personnel	<p>C25PLMBRTXT: Role of Individual Members [Text] OR "No Role" OR -999. Not applicable PIPD-Variable: PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_PIPD (see table 2b in Part II)</p>	<p>C40PLSELC: Do individual members play a role in Selecting/Deciding on leadership candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA</p>	<p><b>The original variables are no longer open questions but closed. This reduces coder bias but could attribute to some differences between the IPD- Index in R1 and the IPD-Index in R2.</b></p>
	<p>C26PLLOCTXT: Role of local organization (eg. Delegate meeting and/or Local Leadership) [Text] OR "No Role" OR -999. Not applicable</p>	<p>C41PLSELC: Do local level organizations (meeting and/or local leadership) play a role in Selecting/Deciding on leadership candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA</p>	
	<p>C27PLREGTXT: Role of regional organization (eg. Delegate meeting and/or Regional Leadership) [Text] OR "No Role" OR -999. Not applicable</p>	<p>C42PLSELC: Do regional/state organizations (meeting and/or regional leadership) play a role in Selecting/Deciding on leadership candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA</p>	
	<p>C28PLNATTXT: Role of national organization (eg. Delegate meeting and/or National Leadership) [Text] OR "No Role" OR -999. Not applicable</p>	<p>C43APLSELC: Does a national party collective body (e.g., Party Congress or National Executive) play a role in Selecting/Deciding on leadership candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA</p>	
	<p>C29PLSUPTXT: Role of non-member supporters Not necessarily "final" vote. "Vote" is sufficient. [Text] OR "No Role" OR -999. Not applicable OPIPD-Variable: PartyLeader_Selection_Vote_OPIPD (see table 2c in Part II)</p>	<p>C45PLSELC: Do non-member supporters play a role in Selecting/Deciding on leadership candidates? A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA</p>	

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Decision-Making: Personnel	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>IPD-Variables:</b>  <b>(1) PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_AIPD (pspAIPD)</b>  <b>(2) PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_PIPD (pspPIPD)</b>  <b>(3) PartyLeader_SelectionVote_Process_OIPD (pspOIPD)</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>If yes [answer to question C40PLVT1], who was eligible to participate in this vote by virtue of their position (e.g., not merely because they also were party members)? If there was not a vote, answer is “not applicable”.</i></p>		
	<p>C44PLVT5: All party congress delegates. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 1: 1</p>	<p>C41PLSELA: Do local level organizations (meeting and/or local leadership) play a role in suggesting/proposing leadership candidates for party consideration?  A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA. Quantification in AIPD Round 2: 1</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>The original variables are no longer available in Round 2. The underlying logic of the new variable is somewhat different (Does party body x play a role in suggesting/ proposing leadership candidates for party consideration?). However, it captures the originally intended aspect: the involvement of different party bodies in the selection of the party leadership.</b></p>
	<p>C46PLVT7: All local party leaders. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 1: 0.75</p>	<p>C42PLSELA: Do regional/state organizations (meeting and/or regional leadership) play a role in suggesting/proposing leadership candidates for party consideration?  A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA. Quantification in AIPD Round 2: 0.75</p>	
	<p>C45PLVT6: Regional party leaders. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 1: 0.5  C42PLVT3: All party legislators. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 1: 0.5</p>	<p>C43APLSELA: Does a national party collective body (e.g., Party Congress or National Executive) play a role in suggesting/proposing leadership candidates for party consideration?  A. Yes B. No -888. Missing -999. NA. Quantification in AIPD Round 2: 0.5</p>	

C41PLVT2: All members of the party's highest-level executive committee. 1. Yes / 2. No / -999. Not applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 1: 0.25

C43BPLSELA Does/do the National Party Leader(s) play a role in suggesting/proposing leadership candidates for party consideration?  
A. Yes B. No -888. Not Provided -999. Not Applicable. Quantification in AIPD Round 2: 0.25

IPD-Component	PPDB-Items Round 1	PPDB-Items Round 2	Comments on change
Decision-Making: Programme	<b>IPD-Variables:</b>  (1) <i>Manifesto_Vote_AIPD (mvAIPD)</i> (2) <i>Manifesto_Vote_PIPD (mvPIPD)</i> (3) <i>Manifesto_Vote_OIPD (mvOIPD)</i>  <b>Role played by each of the following in formulating the party's election manifesto. Formal Input means that there were organized opportunities for the groups to influence the outcome through suggestions and discussion. Vote means having a vote on adopting the final manifesto.</b>		
	C101MAN2: Role of the party leader and/or a drafting committee directly appointed by him/her: 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. Not applicable	C101MAN2: Role of the party leader and/or a drafting committee directly appointed by him/her: 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. NA	nothing changed
	C102MAN3: Role of national executive committee. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. Not applicable	C102MAN3: Role of national executive committee. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. NA	
	C103MAN4: Role of parliamentary party. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. Not applicable	C103MAN4: Role of parliamentary party. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. NA	
	C104MAN5: Party congress delegates. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. Not applicable	C104MAN5: Party congress delegates. 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. NA	
	C106MAN7: Non-member party supporters 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. Not applicable OIPD-Variable: Manifesto_Vote_OIPD	C106MAN7: Non-member party supporters 1. Formal Input / 2. Vote / 3. A and B / 4. Neither A or B / 5. Other / -999. NA OIPD-Variable: Manifesto_Vote_OIPD	

### Further notes

#### Problems regarding the component: Decision-Making Programme

The variables C101MAN2 - C106MAN7 show several missing values. In total 131 parties are lacking values regarding the rules how manifestos are formulated. To counter this problem a second AIPD-Index is calculated that only consists of the dimensions "Decision-Making: Personnel" and "Organizational-Structure" (AIPD\_WM). Both indices are highly correlated with each other ( $r=0.82$ ).

The component Decision-Making Programme is missing completely in the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Japan, Chile, Romania, USA, Slovakia, South Africa, Latvia, Zambia, Namibia, Uganda

The component is missing partially in the following countries: Austria, Israel, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Botswana, Tanzania, Serbia, Zimbabwe, Denmark, Ireland

The component is available: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Greece, Peru, Lithuania, Switzerland